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Abstract
In cognitive radio networks, spectrum sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack is a crucial factor deteriorating the
detection performance of cooperative spectrum sensing. In this paper, we propose and analyze a novel probabilistic
soft SSDF attack model, which goes beyond the existing models for its generalization. Under this generalized SSDF
attack model, we firstly obtain closed form expressions of global sensing performance at the fusion center. Then, we
theoretically evaluate the performance of the proposed attack model, in terms of destructiveness and stealthiness,
sequentially. Numerical simulations match the analytical results well. Last but not least, an interesting trade-off
between destructiveness and stealthiness is discovered, which is a fundamental issue involved in SSDF attack,
however, ignored by most of the previous studies.
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1 Introduction
Cognitive radio (CR) has been regarded as a promising
technology to improve the spectrum utilization [1]. To
enable CR, cooperative spectrum sensing, among multi-
ple spectrum sensors, is one of the key technologies [2].
However, due to the openness of low-layer protocol stack
of CR, the reliability of cooperative spectrum sensing is
challenged by many security threats [3].
The most well-known security threat is the spectrum
sensing data falsification (SSDF) attack [4], where abnor-
mal or malicious spectrum sensors falsify their true sens-
ing results. The main goal of SSDF attack can be roughly
expressed as two points. One point is to decrease the
global detection probability for disturbing the normal
operation of the primary user (PU). The other is to
increase the global probability of false alarm with the pur-
pose of wasting the access opportunities of the honest
secondary users (SUs).
Previous studies on SSDF attack modeling can be gen-
erally grouped into two classes: hard SSDF attack and soft
SSDF attack. Briefly, in hard SSDF attack, malicious SUs
falsify their local binary decisions [5-8], while in soft SSDF
attack, malicious SUs falsify their received energy values.
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Compared to hard SSDF attack, soft SSDF attack is gen-
erally more powerful and elusory for its relatively larger
value space [9-12], since malicious SUs falsify real energy
observations, rather than binary decisions, to mislead the
fusion center (FC).
Three soft SSDF attack models have been widely
adopted to test various secure sensing algorithms: Always
Yes [13], Always No [14,15], and Always Adverse [16]. In
Always Yes soft SSDF attack, an attacker raises its local
observations by injecting a positive offset in every sens-
ing slot. In Always No attack, an attacker decreases its
local observations by injecting a negative offset in every
sensing slot. In Always Adverse attack, an attacker firstly
performs a local binary hypothesis testing betweenH0 and
H1 by comparing its energy observation with a predefined
threshold, withH0 denoting the case that the primary sig-
nal is absent and H1 otherwise; then, the malicious SU
raises its observations when its local binary decision is
H0 and decreases its observations when its decision is H1.
One main limitation of the existing soft SSDF attack mod-
els is that they are oversimplified and not general enough
to serve as the baseline for the design of counter-attack or
secure sensing algorithms.
Motivated by the observations above, in this paper, we
start with an objective to develop a more general soft
SSDF attack model, which should go beyond the existing
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models and include them as special cases. We also con-
sider that each attacker should be smart to have dual goals
in mind: (i) causing harmful disturb to cooperative spec-
trum sensing and (ii) protecting itself against being easily
detected. Specifically, the main contributions of this paper
are as follows:
• Propose a generic probabilistic soft SSDF attack
model and derive the corresponding closed-form
expressions of global sensing performance at the
fusion center.
• Analyze the destructiveness of the proposed attack
model under three general scenarios and obtain the
corresponding optimal attack strategies.
• Define a stealthiness metric and analyze the
stealthiness of the proposed attack model under a
classical secure sensing algorithm.
• Discover an interesting trade-off between
destructiveness and stealthiness, which is a
fundamental issue involved in SSDF attack, however,
ignored by most of the previous studies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 presents the spectrum sensing preliminaries. In
Section 3, we formulate the proposed probabilistic soft
SSDF attack model and present the analysis of its impacts
on the sensing performance. Analytical results on destruc-
tiveness and stealthiness of the proposed attack model
are provided in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. Numer-
ical results are given in Section 6, and conclusions are
provided in Section 7.
2 Spectrum sensing preliminaries
As shown in Figure 1, we consider a cooperative spectrum
sensing system consisting of N SUs and a FC. Each SU
Figure 1 Cooperative spectrum sensing system. PU, primary user;
SU, secondary user; FC, fusion center.
conducts energy detection and transmits its observation
to the FC. At the FC, the global decision is made based on
the combination of observations. In particular, there are
somemalicious SUs reporting falsified observations to the
FC to deteriorate the spectrum sensing performance.
For a given frequency band, spectrum sensing is gener-
ally formulated as a binary hypotheses as follows:
H0 : ri(t) = ni(t), i = 1, 2 . . . ,N
H1 : ri(t) = hi(t)si(t) + ni(t), i = 1, 2 . . . ,N , (1)
where H0 denotes the case that the primary signal is
absent and H1 denotes the case that PU is present, N is
the number of SUs, ri(t) is the t-th sample of the i-th
SU’s received signal, si(t) is the PU’s transmit signal, hi(t)
is the channel gain, and ni(t) denotes the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN).
With an energy detector, the collected energy obser-




where U = TW is the time-bandwidth product. Accord-
ing to the central limit theorem, when U is large enough
(e.g., U >> 10), xEi can be well approximated as a Gaus-
sian random variable under both hypothesesH0 andH1 as
follows [14,16,17]:{










where u0i = 2U, σ 20i = 4U, u1i = 2U(γi + 1), σ 21i =
4U(2γi + 1) and γi is the received SNR of the ith SU.
The local binary decision di at the i-th SU can be







At the FC, a weighted combination is generally used to









where ηf is the global threshold at the FC and wi ∈ [0, 1]
is the weight assigned to the i-th SU by the FC, and∑N
i=1 wi = 1.
3 Probabilistic soft SSDF attack
In this section, we will propose a generic soft SSDF attack
model and present the analysis of its impacts on the
sensing performance. Before going into deep analysis, we
declare that a generic and effective SSDF attack model
should at least have the following features:
• Attackers should be able to exploit their local sensing
results to implement effective attacks, and the
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imperfection of the local sensing results should also
be considered.
• Attackers should be able to jointly consider harmfully
disturbing the FC to obtain wrong decisions and
reliably protecting itself from being easily detected,
by properly adjusting attack parameters.
3.1 The proposed attack model
Based on considerations previously mentioned, a prob-
abilistic soft SSDF attack model is proposed as follows.
Firstly, an attacker (say, the i-th SU) makes its local binary
decision via (3). Then, it utilizes a probability pi to decide
whether to perform attack. If it decides to attack, it will
randomly produce a Gaussian value as sensing result to
report; otherwise, it will hold its true observation. Mathe-






{ pi→ x ∼ N(u2i, σ 22i)
1−pi→ x = xEi
xEi H1
{ pi→ x ∼ N(u3i, σ 23i)
1−pi→ x = xEi
(5)
where u2i and σ 22i, respectively, denote the mean and vari-
ance when the local decision of the i-th SU is H0 (i.e.,
PU is absent), u3i and σ 23i denote the mean and variance
when the local decision is H1. Obviously, for an honest
SU, the attack probability equals to zero. For a malicious
SU, the attack probability pi ∈ (0, 1). Naturely, the two
mean values of random distributions have such a relation:
u2i ≥ u3i, as the attacker generally falsifies sensing results
by reversing them. To facilitate the following analysis, we
define (u2i, u3i) as the attack strength and consider the
case σ 22i = σ 23i = σ 21i.
The attack model in (5) is general enough to include
the existing models as special cases, via properly adjusting
the attack parameters (u2i, u3i, pi). For example, Always
No [13], Always Yes [14,15], and Always Adverse attacks
[16] can be realized when (u2i, u3i, pi) is set as (u0i, u0i, 1),
(u1i, u1i, 1) and (u1i, u0i, 1), respectively. In particular, the
attack probability pi can make the proposed attack more
elusory and flexible.
3.2 Local sensing performance under probabilistic soft
SSDF attack
For the proposed attack model in the Section 3.1, the
probability density function (PDF) of the reported result
by the i-th malicious SU, under hypothesisH0 andH1, can










































































































































represents the PDF of the Gaussian vari-
able x with the mean ui and standard deviation σi, Q (x) is
the Gaussian Q-function and ηi is local threshold.
3.3 Global sensing performance under probabilistic soft
SSDF attack
In a cooperative spectrum sensing system with a FC and
N SUs, among which the first k SUs are malicious attack-
ers, the FC fuses results from both malicious SUs and
honest SUs via Equation 4. The fusion result’s PDF, under







am11am22 · · ·amkk
· f
⎛
⎜⎝ x− w1um11 − w2um22 · · · − wkumkk − uh0√










bm11bm22 · · ·bmkk
· f
⎛
⎜⎝ x− w1um11 − w2um22 · · · − wkumkk − uh1√
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In (8) and (9), we have







































Let Pf and Pd denote the probabilities of detection and
false alarm at the FC, respectively, which can be obtained
as







am11am22 · · · amkk ·
·Q
⎛
⎜⎝ηf − w1um11 − w2um22 · · · − wkumkk − uh0√











bm11bm22 · · · bmkk ·
·Q
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⎜⎝ηf − w1um11 − w2um22 · · · − wkumkk − uh1√





In this section, we evaluate the impacts of the three model
parameters pi, u2i, u3i on the proposed attack model’s
destructiveness. Specifically, we analyze three general and
actual scenarios in sequence:
(i) Probabilistic attack : The optimal attack probability is
derived to cause the largest harm to FC’s detection
performance.
(ii) Contention attack : Setting appropriate attack
strength, a malicious SU implements the optimal
attack to maximize the global probability of false
alarm to waste access opportunities of honest SUs.
(iii) Interference attack : With specific attack strength, a
malicious SU conducts the optimal attack with the
purpose of minimizing the global probability of
detection to disturb the normal operation of the
primary user.
Furthermore, without loss of generality, in the following
analysis, the weight wi is set as 1/N .
4.1 Probabilistic attack
Consider a scenario that a malicious SU aims to deterio-
rate spectrum sensing performance of the system, raising
Pf and reducing Pd. Here, we analyze the impacts of
the attack probability pi on performing the above attack
objective. The problem can be expressed as:
max
pi
{(1 − Pd) P (H1) + Pf P (H0)},
subject to u2i = u1i,u3i = u0i.
(13)
Theorem 1. For the given attack strength (u2i, u3i) =
(u1i, u0i), the probability of detection Pd decreases with the
attack probability pi and the probability of false alarm Pf
increases with pi.
Proof. Given (u2i, u3i) = (u1i, u0i), ∀ > 0, we have
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Furthermore, we have






wnumn1 − wiu0i − uh0√∑
n =i








wnumn1 − wiu2i − uh0√∑
n =i
wn2σ 2mnn + wi2σ 21i + σ 2h0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
∴ Pf (pi + ) − Pf (pi) > 0
Consequently, the probability of false alarm Pf increases
with the attack probability pi. Similarly, we can obtain
Pd (pi + ) − Pd (pi) < 0, and thus the probability of
detection Pd decreases with pi. Therefore, the detec-
tion error probability Pe = {(1− Pd)P (H1) + Pf P (H0)}
increases with pi.
Note that Theorem 1 without taking into account any
defense or secure sensing algorithms at the FC, obviously,
a malicious SU with a high attack probability is prone to
being easily found out for its low stealthiness, which will
be further studied in the next section.
4.2 Contention attack
Consider a scenario that a malicious SU intends to con-
tend with honest SUs for secondary access opportunities,
i.e., to induce the FC to maximize the probability of false




subject to Pd = β ∈ (0, 1).
(15)
To simplify proofs, we assume that there exists a single
malicious SU (i.e., the i-th SU) in the system. Simul-
taneously, to partially ensure the stealthiness of attack
behaviors, attack strength is limited (see Appendix).
Theorem 2. Given the probability of detection as Pd = β
and the attack probability as pi = pa, the probability of
false alarm Pf increases with u2i.
Proof. For a given probability of detection at the FC, we
have
Pd(u2i, u3i) = β . (16)
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⎜⎝Nηf − u3i − Nuh0√
σ 21i +N2σ 2h0
⎞
⎟⎠ du3idu2i . (18)
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Theorem 2 points out that the global probability of
false alarm can reach the maximum when u2i reaches the
available maximum. This theorem provides us with an
approach to derive the optimal solution of attack strength
to the optimization in (15). Fixed Pd provides an implicit
function about u3i and u2i whose range is limited in the
Appendix. Then based on Theorem 2, the optimal value
can be selected from the set of (u2i, u3i) satisfying the
function.
4.3 Interference attack
Consider another scenario that a malicious SU aims to
bring harmful interference to disturb the normal opera-
tion of the PU, i.e., to minimize the probability of detec-




subject to Pf = α ∈ (0, 1) .
(22)
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Theorem 3. Given the probability of false alarm as Pf =
α and the attack probability as pi = pa, the probability of
detection decreases with u3i.
Proof. For a given probability of false alarm at the FC,
we have
Pf (u2i, u3i) = α. (23)



















⎜⎝Nηf − u3i − Nuh0√





⎜⎝Nηf − u2i −Nuh0√
σ 21i + N2σ 2h0
⎞
⎟⎠ (24)




Theorem 3 points out that the global probability of
detection can reach the maximum when u3i reaches the
available minimum. This theorem provides us with an
approach to derive the optimal solution of attack strength
to the optimization in (22). Fixed Pf provides an implicit
function about u3i and u2i whose range is limited in
Appendix. Then based on Theorem 3, the optiaml value
can be selected from the set of (u2i, u3i) saitisfying the
function.
5 Stealthiness analysis
In the previous section, analysis on destructiveness is
done without taking into consideration any defense or
secure sensing algorithms at the FC, while in this section,
we consider that a classical secure sensing algorithm
developed in [18] is adopted at the FC to find out the
potential attackers. Therefore, stealthiness of the pro-
posed attack model should further be studied.
Current secure algorithms at the FC mainly leverage
history sensing results to identify malicious SUs [3]. To
ensure the generality of the stealthiness analysis, a clas-
sical algorithm developed in [18] is chosen in this paper.
Breifly, we first review this algorithm as follows.
Initially, all SUs are treated as reliable ones with a repu-
tation value of ri(0). Then, the reputation value of the i-th
SU at the k-th time slot is updated as [18]
ri(k) = ri(k − 1) + (−1)di(k)+D(k) (26)
where D(k) represents the global decision at the FC and
di(k) is the i-th SU’s local decision at the k-th time slot.
When the reputation value is lower than a discarded
threshold λ, the SU is identified as a malicious one; other-
wise, it is treated as a honest one. In [18], ri(0) = λ + ,
where λ is set as 1 and  is set as 4. At the k-th time slot,







	i(k) = ln Pr(xEi(k) |H1 )Pr(xEi(k) |H0 )









where S(k) represents the set of SUs with the reputation
values larger than the threshold λ, and
wj(k) = rj(k − 1)∑
i∈S(k) ri(k − 1)
. (29)
Through analysis about the previous algorithm, we

















rmi (k) > 0
0, otherwise
(30)
where Nm is the number of malicious SUs, rmi (k) denotes
the reputation value of the i-th malicious SU, and rhi (k)
denotes the reputation value of the i-th honest SU. We
choose honest SUs as a baseline and the FC hardly dis-
tinguish a malicious SU from malicious ones when the
stealthiness metric is close to 1, that is to say, the mali-
cious SU has good stealthiness. Deeper analysis is done in
the next section.
6 Performance evaluation and discussions
In this section, numerical simulations are used to verify
the analytical results on destructiveness and stealthiness
of the proposed probabilistic soft SSDF attack model.
In the following simulations, the cooperative spectrum
sensing system consists of a FC and N SUs, among which
Nm SUs are malicious. The average received SNR is set
as -7 dB and the local threshold is obtained by setting the
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local false alarm probability as 0.1. The time bandwidth
product U is 100. The probability of primary signal being
present is set as P(H1) = 0.5. Without loss of generality,
in the following simulations, for all malicious SUs, we set
A = 1.1u1i,B = 0.9u0i, u2i = u2, u3i = u3, ∀i = 1, . . . ,Nm.
6.1 Destructiveness evaluation
Figure 2 shows the global sensing performance at the FC
under the proposed SSDF attack model, in terms of global
detection error probability Pe, defined as
Pe = P(H1)(1 − Pd) + P(H0)Pf . (31)
In the simulation, N = 10,Nm = 3. Curves with
four groups of attack strengths (u2, u3) are plotted. We
also plot the curve without malicious SUs as the base-
line. It is shown in Figure 2 that (i) the global detection
error probability increases with the attack probability, (ii)
when the attack strength increases, i.e., increasing of u2
and/or decreasing of u3, the global detection error proba-
bility increases, and (iii) simulations match the theoretical
results very well.
Figure 3 shows the global false alarm probability versus
different detection probabilities, when the malicious SU
implements contention attack as discussed in Section 4.2.
In the simulation, the attack probability is set as 0.7 and
the optimal values of attack strength (u2, u3) is obtained
according to Theorem 2. Remind that in Theorem 2, we
consider the case that there is a single malicious SU in the
system and we set N = 5,Nm = 1. Other two curves are
also presented for comparison when 0.95u2 and 0.9u2 are
set lower than the optimal value u2, u∗3 and u∗∗3 are corre-
spondingly calculated for the given Pd. It can be observed
in Figure 3 that the global false alarm probability Pf gets its
maximum when the malicious SU implements contention
attack.
Figure 2 Global detection performance at the FC under different
attack probabilities. N = 10,Nm = 3.
Figure 3 Global detection performance at the FC under
contention attack. N = 5,Nm = 1.
Figure 4 shows the global detection probability ver-
sus different false alarm probabilities when the mali-
cious SU implements interference attack as discussed in
Section 4.3. In the simulation, the attack probability is
set as 0.7 and optimal value of attack strength (u2, u3)
is obtained according to Theorem 3. Remind that in
Theorem 2, we consider the case that there is a single
malicious SU in the system and we set N = 5,Nm = 1.
Other two curves are also presented for comparison when
1.01u3 and 1.02u3 are set larger than the optimal value u3,
u∗2 and u∗∗2 are correspondingly calculated for the given
Pf . As shown in Figure 4, the global detection probability
Pd gets the minimum when the malicious SU implements
interference attack.
6.2 Stealthiness evaluation
In this subsection, we study the impact of the attack prob-
ability on stealthiness of the proposed attack model. The
Figure 4 Global detection performance at the FC under
interference attack. N = 5,Nm = 1.
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attack strength is set as u2 = u1, u3 = u0, and N =
10,Nm = 3.
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the stealthiness metric,
defined in (30), under different attack probabilities. Two
main observations are as follows:
• After a few sensing slots, the stealthiness metric
restrains itself to a constant value ψ for each given
attack probability pa.
• Malicious users’ stealthiness deteriorates with the
attack probability pa.
Mathematically, denote k as the index of the sensing slot,
the first observation above can be rewritten as:
∃ constantM ∈ R, k > M,ψ(k) = ψ = h(pa) (32)
As shown in Figure 5, the secure algorithm is not suffi-
ciently valid to probabilistic attack. Essentially, the secure
algorithm in [18] uses a reputation accumulation mecha-
nism based on history decision information. However, the
reputation accumulating process is ruined by such mali-
cious SUs that may behave in a honest manner, then turn
malicious at the next moment. Furthermore, there exists
a probability of collision pc(k), with which the i-th mali-
cious SU’s local decision dmi (k) is inconsistent with FC’s
global decision D(k), which can be denoted as
pc(k) = P(dmi (k) = D(k))
= P(H0)P(dmi (k) =D(k)|H0)+P(H1)P(dmi (k) =D(k)|H1)
(33)
Simultaneously, there is a collision between FC’s global
decision and a honest user’s local decision with a proba-
bility pc′(k) during the k-th sensing slot as well. Consistent
with the stealthiness metric, the collision probabilities
restrain themselves to constant values as well.
∃M, k > M,
{
pc(k) = pc
pc′(k) = pc′. (34)
Figure 5 Stealthiness under different attack probabilities.
N = 10,Nm = 3.
Furthermore, we can obtain the relation between col-





The second observation above is opposite to the results
in Figure 2. Briefly, destructiveness in Figure 2 increases
with the attack probability while stealthiness in Figure 5
decreases with the attack probability. Consequently, there
should be a trade-off between stealthiness and destruc-
tiveness with respect to the attack probability.
Motivated by this discovery, we further plot Figure 6,
which shows the global detection error probability Pe of
the robust defense or secure sensing algorithm devel-
oped in [18], under the proposed probabilistic soft attack
model. In the simulation, N = 10,Nm = 3.
Although the x-axis and y-axis of Figures 2 and 6 are
of the same content, their results are quite different. The
main reason behind the differences lies on the fact that
the secure sensing algorithm developed in [18] is adopted
at the FC in producing Figure 6 to discard the detected
malicious SUs before the global fusion. It is observed in
Figure 6 that with defense or secure sensing algorithms
into consideration, there generally exists an optimal attack
probability pa ∈ (0, 1], not necessarily equal to 1.
Taking the curve with the attack strength (u1, u0) as an
example and comparing it with the curve without mali-
cious SUs, we can divide the attack probability into three
intervals:
• An interval with a low attack probability than the first
point drawn as a circle in Figure 6, named role reversal
interval, where malicious SUs’ participation does not
pose harm to FC’s global fusion, but is beneficial to it.
• An interval of a high attack probability than the
second point drawn as a square, named exposure
Figure 6 Relationship between attack performance and attack
probability with destructiveness and stealthiness into
consideration. N = 10,Nm = 3.
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interval, where attackers are found out and removed,
and their powerful attack action is nearly transparent
to FC for their low stealthiness.
• An interval of a medium attack probability between
the above two points, named favorable attack
interval, where effective but stealthy attack can be
implemented.
7 Conclusions
In this paper, a generic and novel probabilistic soft
SSDF attack model has been proposed. In the proposed
attack model, a malicious SU has a certain probabil-
ity, varying from 0 to 1, to conduct attacks. Under this
generalized SSDF attackmodel, we firstly obtained closed-
form expressions of the global sensing performance at
the fusion center. Then, we theoretically evaluated the
performance of the proposed attack model, in terms
of destructiveness and stealthiness, sequentially. More-
over, numerical simulations match the analytical results
well. An interesting trade-off between destructiveness and
stealthiness has also been discovered, which is a funda-
mental issue involved in SSDF attack, however, ignored by
most of the previous studies.
Appendix
Limitation of attack strength
An extremely large or small value viciously reported by
malicious users will bring about huge damage for the
fusion center without any defense schames, but such
attack behaviors are very prone to be identified. So,
before studying optimal attack parameters’ setting, we list
restricted conditions as follows:⎧⎨
⎩
A  u2i  u3i  B
Nηf − uh1 < u3i + u2i2 < Nηf − uh0
(a)
(b) (36)
where A and B are constants. In the condition (a), attack
stength are restricted within certain intervals determined
by the constants A and B and the relationship of size
between u2i and u3i is referred to before, revealing the
attack intention. Further, the condition (b) is used to avoid
the large deviation from honest reports through the inter-
constraint relationship between u2i and u3i, and the two
sides of the inequation can be used to denote the residual
of FC’s threshold minus the honest means.
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